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STRIKING THE BALANCE: SEARCH
WARRANTS AND ENCRYPTION
PROTECTED SMARTPHONES
BY NICHOLAS A. OLIVA1
INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are the parent of a dead 15-year-old girl whose
life has just been cut short by a stray bullet. You have been up for
days now, and you find yourself sitting in the hall of the New York
County District Attorney’s Office. The door of one of the assistant
district attorney’s offices opens, and you take a seat in front of her
across from a large, mahogany desk.
The attorney tells you she has good news and bad news. The
good news: a suspect is being questioned. The bad news: they have
not been to access crucial information implicating the suspect in
the shooting because the information is being stored on an iPhone
6s, and they could not bypass the privacy protection on the
encrypted iPhone.2 The only way to gain access to the phone is to
get suspect to cooperate—but the truth is that simply will not
happen. She informs you that without the information on the
phone, the attorney will not have enough evidence to prosecute
your daughter’s murderer. This is exactly the balancing of rights
the courts face when approaching smartphone searches: will the
interest of the citizen, or of law enforcement prevail? Just as the
hypothetical illustrates — “privacy comes at a cost.”3
1 J.D. Candidate, St. John’s University School of Law, 2018.
2 See Emma Raviv, Homing in: Technology’s Place in

Fourth Amendment
Jurisprudence, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 593, 612 (2015) (stating that encryption takes the
text contained in the document, and converts it into ciphertext (encrypted text), which can
only be converted into plaintext (readable text) with the correct encryption key); see
generally Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (holding warrantless
wiretaps were constitutional because there was neither a physical invasion nor an official
search and seizure of a person).
3 Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 401 (2014) (stating “[w]e cannot deny that our
decision today will have an impact on the ability of law enforcement to combat crime. Cell
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We need not further hypothesize. Manhattan District Attorney
Cyrus Vance recently reported that law enforcement was unable
to execute search warrants on smartphones in over a hundred
instances because the devices were running iOS 84 software that
encrypts the cell phone’s data. 5 More often than not, the
information guarded by the smartphone’s encryption software is
not just useful, but it is often crucial.6 Moreover, these cases do
not just concern low-level crimes, but include homicides,
attempted murders, sexual abuse of a child, sex trafficking,
assault, and robbery. 7 The words of a family who had the life of a
loved one stolen by a murderer put the stakes of this issue into
perspective:
It hurts us every day to know that the identity of my sister’s
killer remains sitting inside a phone in an evidence room. As a
family, we call on our elected leaders to pass comprehensive
legislation to allow law enforcement access to valuable
information. We ask this for victims’ families like ours, who live in
pain every day. We owe this fight to my sister and nephew, and for
all of our nation’s victims and their family members, as well. 8
Shortly after Cyrus Vance released that report, the law
enforcement crisis with encrypted smartphones made national
phones have become important tools in facilitating coordination and communication among
members of criminal enterprises, and can provide valuable incriminating information about
dangerous criminals.”).
4 CYRUS VANCE, JR., REPORT OF MANHATTAN DISTRICT A TTORNEY’S OFFICE ON
SMARTPHONE ENCRYPTION AND PUBLIC SAFETY, at 1 (2015) (stating “[i]n September 2014,
Apple Inc. announced that its new operating system, iOS 8, would be designed such that
when a phone or other device running iOS 8 locks, no one but the user or another person
with the device’s passcode, could open it.”).
5 Id. at 9.
6 Id. (emphasis added).
7 Id.
8 District Attorney Vance, NYPD, Crime Victims’ Advocates Call on Congress to
#UnlockJustice, MANHATTANDA.ORG (Apr. 18, 2016), https://www.manhattanda.org/
district-attorney-vance-nypd-crime-victims-advocates-call-congress-unlockjustice/16/
(providing statements from Ernie Allen, Founding Chairman, former President, and CEO
of the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children, who stated “We need to find the
right balance,” Joyful Heart Foundation Managing Director Sarah Haacke Byrd, who
stated “Leaders, including policymakers, law enforcement, victim advocates, and survivors,
must come together to work with technology companies to ensure that law enforcement has
the necessary tools at its disposal to fully investigate crimes and to hold violent offenders
accountable. Jointly we must examine how current encryption policies, while attempting to
preserve privacy, may be diminishing the ability of law enforcement from doing all that
they can to seek justice for victims of sexual assault, domestic violence and child abuse, and
provide some level of closure for their families.”).

DOCUMENT1 (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

4/24/2019 3:43 PM

SEARCH WARRANTS & ENCRYPTED SMARTPHONES

409

headlines with the San Bernardino shooting. On December 2,
2015, Syed Rizwan Farook and his wife, Tashfeen Malik, killed 14
people and wounded another 24 people in an act of domestic
terrorism.9 A crucial piece of information was recovered—Farook’s
cellphone.10 The subsequent investigation centered around the cell
phone, because the hope was that the phone would provide
evidence of the shooters’ possible motives, co-conspirators or
accomplices, as well as other crucial information that could
explain their heinous act of violence.11 Just as in the hypothetical
case described above, law enforcement was unable to access the
recovered cell phone because they did not have the necessary
passwords, and the terrorists themselves had been shot and killed
in a hail of bullets after fleeing the carnage they created.
At the core of the legal dispute between the FBI and Apple lies
an issue that has been developing for over a decade with the
development of password encryption: what are the consequences
when the government’s ability to search a private citizen’s
smartphone is compromised, and thus, there is less access to the
extensive information stored on such devices? 12 What grabbed
headlines was the fact that the FBI requested the Court to order
Apple to “Assist Agents in Search.”13 Essentially, the FBI wanted
Apple to provide three things: (1) access to the recovered iPhone
by means of bypassing or disabling any function that could wipe
out all the information on the phone; (2) unlimited chances to try
to crack the iPhone’s code by connecting it to a port, or using
Bluetooth, Wi-Fi or any other means that would allow such a

9 Richard Pérez-Peña & Adam Goldman, ‘It Finally Clicked That This Wasn’t an
Exercise’: Report Recounts San Bernardino Shooting, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/10/us/it-finally-clicked-that-this-wasnt-an-exercisereport-recounts-san-bernardino-shooting.html?_r=0.
10 Id.
11 See In re Search of an Apple IPhone Seized During Execution of a Search Warrant
on a Black Lexus IS300, California License Plate 35KGD203, No. ED 15-0451M, 2016 WL
618401, at 1 (C.D. Cal. 2016).
12 See Apple Inc’s Mot. to Vacate Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in
Search, and Opp’n to Government’s Mot. to Compel Assistance, In re Search of an Apple
Iphone Seized During the Execution of A Search Warrant on a Black Lexus Is300,
California License Plate 35kgd203., 2016 WL 767457 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
13 See In re Search of an Apple IPhone Seized During Execution of a Search Warrant
on a Black Lexus IS300, supra note 11 at 1.
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function; and (3) neutralization of function on iPhones that sets a
time delay after a number of incorrect passcode attempts. 14
Apple responded to this demand by recognizing two major
considerations that are in tension with one another: the need for
law enforcement to be armed with as much information as possible
in order to be effective and the rights of private citizens to be
secure in their possessions, namely their cell phones.15 Apple saw
this request as the FBI’s attempt to compromise its product’s
security functions, which would allow a password to be input
electronically to unlock that device.16 If Apple was to enable the
FBI to use “brute force”17 tactics in order to unlock the iPhone, it
would amount to the government simply “compel[ling] Apple to
create a crippled and insecure product.” 18 Moreover, Apple feared
the promulgation of that product onto the market, because it
anticipated it would create privacy concerns for millions of iPhone
users who would be now vulnerable not just to government
infringement of privacy, as well as “provide[] an avenue for
criminals and foreign agents” to access such information. 19
Compliance with such an order would compromise the integrity of
their product, and be outright unconstitutional.
This note addresses the various issues presented by the
obstacles data encryption has created for law enforcement by
placing in tension the American citizen’s right to privacy through
the use of data encryption, and law enforcement’s ability to
conduct lawful searches through the use of warrants. Essentially,
my proposal sets out to do two things: (1) ensure the protections
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to United States Citizens;
14 Id. The original language of the FBI’s request of Apple to “Assist Agent in Search”
stated:
(1) it will bypass or disable the auto-erase function whether or not it has been enabled; (2)
it will enable the FBI to submit passcodes to the subject device for testing electronically via
the physical device port, Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, or other protocol available on the subject device;
and (3) it will ensure that when the FBI submits passcodes to the subject device, software
running on the device will not purposefully introduce any additional delay between
passcode attempts beyond what is incurred by the Apple hardware.
15 Apple Inc’s Mot. To Vacate Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in Search,
and Opp’n to Govt’s Mot. To Compel Assistance, supra note 12 at 2.
16 Id. at 7.
17 Id. at 2 (“‘[B]rute force’ [operates by] trying thousands or millions of passcode
combinations with the speed of a modern computer.”).
18 Id.
19 Id.
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and (2) give law enforcement a viable avenue to investigate crimes,
while simultaneously providing Apple the security that the
privacy of its customers will be as protected as it has ever been
through carefully tailored legislation.
This note’s analysis of searches of encrypted cell phone will be
broken down into in three parts. Part I of this note provides
context for the balance between individual privacy and law
enforcement by reviewing general Fourth Amendment principles
and then Supreme Court rulings that apply these principles to cell
phones. Part II then details the advancements in cell phone
technology, specifically encryption. These new technologies
render the data on cell phones inaccessible and lead law
enforcement to go beyond search warrants and seek special orders
pursuant to the All Writs Act. Part II provides an overview of the
All Writs Act and the leading cases that define its scope and
concludes that the act does not provide a power to courts to order
the decryption of cell phones. Part III then asserts why a judicial
response is inadequate to address the issues caused by encryption,
and why new legislation is needed that will effectively and
lawfully strike the balance between the interests surrounding
data encryption on smartphones.
I.

THE EVOLUTION OF FOURTH AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE WITH THE INTRODUCTION OF
SMARTPHONE TECHNOLOGY

A. Fourth Amendment Background
Every citizen of the United States has the right to be free from
unreasonable government intrusion.20 This right is derived from
the Fourth Amendment that provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their person, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated and no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly

20 U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV.
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describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.21
Essentially, the government is required to obtain a warrant
from a judge and that warrant must be supported by probable
cause prior to executing a search or seizure. Moreover, depending
on the circumstances of the case, evidence obtained without
satisfaction of the Fourth Amendment mandates will be excluded
from court proceedings.22
In 1928, in Olmstead the Court ruled that the rights of a citizen
against unreasonable searches and seizures were only violated
when there was a physical intrusion into one’s property.23 Thus, it
was held that a warrantless wiretap that was placed on the street
outside the defendant’s home, among other places did not violate
the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights because the protections
of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and
seizures were not activated.24
Four decades later in Katz,25 this Court further clarified when
the protections of the Fourth Amendment apply. Once again, the
Court wrestled with a wiretap device, but this time it was placed
on the outside of a public telephone booth without a warrant and
used to eavesdrop on a conversations made with the public
telephone.26 The government contended that because there was
“no physical penetration,” into the defendant’s property, there was
no intrusion that triggers the Fourth Amendment.27 However, the
Court agreed with the Petitioner’s assertion that notwithstanding
the absence of “‘technical trespass,’” 28 the government violated the
defendant’s constitutional rights because “what he sought to

21 Id.
22 See Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 796–97, (1984) (quoting Nardone v. United

States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939), “The exclusionary rule reaches not only primary evidence
obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure, but also evidence later discovered
and found to be derivative of an illegality or “fruit of the poisonous tree.”).
23 See Raviv, supra note 2 at 595; see also, Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
478 (1928).
24 See Raviv, supra note 2 at 595; see also, Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. at 478.
25 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 347 (1967).
26 See id. at 349.
27 Id. at 352.
28 Id. at 353 (holding that the Fourth Amendment protects not only the seizure of
tangible items, but also extends to recordings of oral statements overheard as well, despite
the absence of physical intrusion).
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exclude . . . was not the intruding eye—it was the uninvited ear.”29
In so deciding, the Court explained that “[t]he Fourth amendment
protects people—and not simply ‘areas’—against unreasonable
searches and seizures.” 30 Thus, the Court departed from the
narrowly construed principles of Olmstead in favor of a more
contemporary view that derived from the evolution of the “vital
role” the public telephone had come to play in communications.31
Therefore, Katz’s Fourth Amendment protections were deemed
to be activated because: “first[,] [he] exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation [was] one that society [was] prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable.’”32 This framework has endured the test of time, and
continues to inform the application of the Fourth Amendment,
even with the continuing advancements in technology in the last
few decades.
The Supreme Court of the United States has extended this line
of reasoning to encompass the reasonable expectation of privacy
that a citizen has in the contents of their cell phone.33 In Riley, the
Court held that in order to search an individual’s cell phone
incident to a lawful arrest, “[a] warrant is generally required.”34
This decision recognized that modern cell phones had an
“immense storage capacity” greater than anything ever been
encountered by the judiciary before, such as a cigarette pack, a
wallet, or a purse.35
The Riley Court was extremely cognizant of the imminent
expansion of the capacity of smartphones. 36 Because of this
capacity, tension continues to grow between the private citizen
trying to protect their information on smartphones, and law
enforcement’s interest of being able to access pertinent
information relating to law enforcement investigations. While the
29
30
31
32
33

Id. at 352.
Id. at 353.
See id. at 352.
Id. at 361.
See United States v. Zavala, 541 F.3d 562, 577 (5th Cir. 2008) (recognizing that “cell
phones contain a wealth of private information,” and, as a result, individuals have a
“reasonable expectation of privacy” in them).
34 Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 401 (2014).
35 See id. at 393.
36 See id. at 394 (“We expect that the gulf between physical predictability and digital
capacity will only continue to widen in the future”).
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Riley Court ultimately deemed the contents of a smartphone
subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant
requirement,37 it fell short of giving the law enforcement guidance
on how to approach the execution of warrants on encrypted cell
phones.
Investigators soon realized that search warrants, even when
granted, did not guarantee access. In the words of FBI director
James Comey during his address of a Congressional Committee,
“[u]ntil [smartphone encryption], there was no closet in America,
no safe in America, no garage in America, no basement in America
that could not be entered with a judge’s order.”38 However,
password encryption changed all that. Accordingly, Comey
argued, we have come to a point where the individual privacy
interests of a citizen to be secure in the contents of their phone by
using data encryption, must give way to the interest of security
when law enforcement obtains a valid search warrant to access
that very same information. 39
While a valid search warrant would legally permit the law
enforcement to access information on a cell phone,40 it does not
provide physical access. For an encrypted cell phone, only the
password will allow law enforcement to access the necessary
information. Most of the time criminals do not willingly divulge
their passwords; the next step after securing the proper Fourth
Amendment search warrant then is judicially compelling the
assistance of the producers of the encryption technology. A
thorough understanding of how law enforcement traditionally
obtained such assistance in similar, earlier circumstances is the
logical starting point.

37 Id. at 386.
38 Nancy Dillon, FBI May Have Different Way to Access San Bernardino Shooter’s

Phone, May Not Need Apple’s Hack Help, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, (Mar. 22, 2016, 8:27 AM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/fbi-access-san-bernardino-shooter-phonearticle-1.2572539.
39 See The Encryption Tightrope: Balancing Americans’ Security and Privacy, Hearing
Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 79 (2016) (statement of Hon. James B.
Comey, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation).
40 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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B. Examination of Government Interaction With Third Party
Intermediaries, And the Changes Spurred By The Development Of
Smartphone Technology
1. Compelling the Assistance of Third-Party Intermediaries
Traditionally, law enforcement was able to circumvent the
efforts of targets that were trying to hide information crucial to
investigations, because this information would necessarily pass
through third-party intermediaries, such as telephone companies
or banks.41 In cases concerning third-party intermediaries, the
subject’s reasonable expectation of privacy was determined to be
lost by virtue of their “voluntarily” turning over, or “knowingly
expo[sing]” that information to a third party.42 Accordingly, the
Court has determined the search or seizure of that information
would be lawful, as the user of the third-party intermediaries
essentially assumed the risk that such data would, in one way or
another, not be kept private.
New York Telephone Co. illustrates this concept.43 There, the
FBI suspected that a particular location in a Manhattan
neighborhood was home to a gambling operation.44 Under the
authority of a federal statute known as the All Writs Act, the FBI
subsequently motioned the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York to order the New York Telephone
Company to install a pen register that would record the telephone
numbers that were being called or received from that location. 45
The district court judge found there was probable cause to issue
an All Writs order to compel New York Telephone to provide the
necessary technical assistance required to install the pen
41 See Raviv, supra note 2, at 595.
42 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976) (finding no expectation of

privacy where documents voluntarily given to bank); see also In re U.S. for Historical Cell
Site Data, 723 F.3d 600, 610 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press
v. Am. Tel. &
Tel. Co., 593 F.2d 1030, 1043 (D.C. Cir.1978) “‘To the extent an
individual knowingly exposes his
activities
to third parties,
he
surrenders Fourth Amendment protections . . . .’”).
43 See United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977).
44 Id. at 161-62.
45 See id. at 161, 163.
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register.46 New York Telephone complied, but subsequently
appealed the order by arguing that the government did not have
power to compel such assistance under the All Writs Act.47
Ultimately, the Court upheld the decision of the District Court
in finding that that the All Writs Act empowered the Court to
compel an order of assistance from the telephone company.48 The
Court laid out three elements that are necessary to determine if
assistance is warranted: (1) whether the intermediary is too
attenuated from the situation; (2) whether compelling assistance
is unreasonably burdensome; and (3) whether assistance is
necessary to effectuate the warrant. 49 In its analysis, the Court
found that the order for assistance was closely related to the
controversy as the company had direct control over the medium of
communication.50 Moreover, the court reasoned that the company
was not burdened by providing such “meager assistance” to the
FBI.51 Finally, the court order was proven to be necessary because
there was “no conceivable way” that the FBI would be able to
execute this operation without the help of New York Telephone
Co.52 Accordingly, the Court’s order was found to be constitutional,
and the order to compel New York Telephone Co.’s assistance,
proper. 53
New York Telephone Co., stands for the broader proposition that
law enforcement has always had a reliable way to physically
access to even guarded information because of the power granted
by the All Writs Act to compel the assistance of third party
intermediaries.54 However, with the introduction of data

46 Id. at 162. “A pen register is a mechanical device that records the numbers dialed on
a telephone by monitoring the electrical impulses caused when the dial on the telephone is
released. It does not overhear oral communications and does not indicate whether calls are
actually completed.” Id. at 161 n.1 A pen register is “usually installed at a central telephone
facility [and] records on a paper tape all numbers dialed from [the] line” to which it is
attached. United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 549 n.1 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
47 See N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 162-63.
48 See id. at 172.
49 See id. at 160.
50 See id. at 174.
51 See id.
52 See id. at 175 (1977).
53 See id. at 177-78.
54 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976); see also Smith v. Maryland,
442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979); but see U.S. v. Taketa, 923 F.2d 665, 676 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding
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encryption, the strategy of simply subpoenaing information from
third party intermediaries has become essentially obsolete, if not
impossible.55
2. Default Encryption Has Made The Traditional Methods of
Compelling the Assistance of Third Party Intermediaries
Outdated
Smartphone encryption is a product of the advancements made
by society in the realm of technology. For example, in 2011,
smartphone ownership was a mere 35% amongst adults. 56 By
2015, that number had nearly doubled to 68%. 57 This huge growth
of smartphone ownership was accompanied by the public’s
demand to have the strongest possible privacy and security
protections.58 Apple, for example, has been happy to provide just
that. Apple has been at the forefront of protecting the privacy of
its customers through the use of encryption, which is evident in
their privacy policy published online that reads:
Encryption protects trillions of online transactions each day.
When you’re shopping, paying a bill, or using iMessage or
FaceTime, you’re using encryption. It turns your data into
indecipherable text that can be read only by those with the right
key . . . We also refuse to add a backdoor into any of our products.59
The use of cell phones has become extremely prevalent in
society, so much so “that the proverbial visitor from Mars might
conclude that they were an important feature of human
anatomy.”60 However, the same impetus for the creation of such

that an area readily open to the public does not create a right of access such that the
person’s expectation of privacy is automatically compromised).
55 See Raviv, supra note 2, at 612 (“Once encrypted, an Internet communication is
practically impossible to decrypt by guessing—such a process would “occupy a
supercomputer for millions of years”).
56 See David M. Lenz, Is the Cloud Finally Lifting? Planning for Digital Assets, ALI
CLE EST. PLAN. COURSE MATERIALS J. 35, 35 (Feb. 2017).
57 Id.
58 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Act | the App Association in Support of Apple Inc.’s Motion
to Vacate Order Compelling Assistance, In re Search of an Apple IPhone Seized during the
Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, California License Plate
35KGD203., 2016 WL 1228636 (C.D. Cal. 2016).
59 Apple’s
Privacy Policy, APPLE,
http://www.apple.com/privacy/approach-toprivacy/#safe-device (last visited Feb. 5, 2019).
60 Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014).
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encryption has created an even greater concern for law
enforcement.
Prominent political figures and heads of law enforcement have
come forth to voice their concerns regarding the encryption of
information contained on cell phones because of the formidable
obstacle they present to criminal investigations and prosecutions.
President Barrack Obama has addressed the issue of encryption
by stating:
[I]f we get into a situation which the technologies do not allow
us at all to track somebody we’re confident is a terrorist … and
despite knowing that information, despite having a phone number
or social-media address or email address, that we can’t penetrate
that, that’s a problem.61
The director of the FBI, James Comey, has also voiced concerns
with regard to tech giants like Apple and Google on “going dark”
which creates barriers for law enforcement to gather information
to prevent the next terrorist attack.62At the State level, District
Attorney Cyrus Vance has voiced similar concerns with regard to
the cases that enter Manhattan courtrooms each and every day.
Vance has stated that hundreds of criminal cases are harmed by
encryption software that can be found on the phones of criminals.63
Prior to the advancements that software designers made in
encryption, law enforcement agencies were able to engage in
various methods to try to “crack” the encrypted devices.64 One such
method utilized by law enforcement is called a “brute force
attack.”65 This method of code cracking involves a computer trying
every key combination in an effort to find the correct password

61 Cody M. Poplin, President Obama Comments on Back-doors in Encryption, LAWFARE
(Jan. 16, 2015, 5:50 PM), http://bit.ly/1nsk5P1 (“[The President] continued by not[ing] the
difficult and sometime tenuous balance between security, liberty, and privacy, and stated
that debate with civil libertarians and privacy groups had been “useful.”).
62 See James Comey, Director, Fed. Bureau Investigations, Going Dark: Are Technology
Privacy, and Public Safety on a Collision Course?, FBI (Oct. 16, 2014),
https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/going-dark-are-technology-privacy-and-public-safetyon-a-collision-course.
63 See Jamil N. Jaffer & Daniel J. Rosenthal, Decrypting Our Security: A Bipartisan
Argument For a Rational Solution to the Encryption Challenge, 24 CATH. U. J. L. & TECH.
273, 292 (2016).
64 See generally J. Riley Atwood, The Encryption Problem: Why the Courts and
Technology are Creating a Mess For Law Enforcement, 34 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 407,
411 (2015).
65 See id.
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that will unlock the encryption.66 However, the amount of time
that this method takes can vary greatly depending on the
complexity of the password, and can be anywhere from a few
hours, to a few days, or even a few years, thereby causing the
“brute force” method obsolete.67
With Apple’s unwavering advocacy for the privacy rights of its
customers, and law enforcement struggling to overcome
encryption technology while also abiding by the Fourth
Amendment in searches and seizures, former FBI director James
Comey poses one simple question that puts the stakes of this issue
into focus: “‘it’s only a matter of time before there’s an incident
where we say, “Who gave [Apple CEO] Tim Cook the right to
decide whether a parent can find a lost child?”‘“ 68
II.

THE SAN BERNARDINO TERRORIST’S ENCRYPTED
SMARTPHONE, AND LAW ENFORCEMENT’S INABILITY TO
EXECUTE LAWFUL WARRANTS THEREON

A. The San Bernardino Attack
The intersection between an individual’s right to privacy and the
need for law enforcement to access encrypted data caught the
national spotlight on December 2, 2015, 69 at approximately 11:00
a.m., when a group of co-workers gathered for training at the
Inland Regional Center (“IRC”), in San Bernardino, California. 70
Suddenly, a door swung open, and a single masked person wearing
all black, and carrying a firearm stepped inside the room.71
Without a word, he began opening fire.72 Pandemonium ensued.
Pandemonium ensued. A second shooter joined the attack, and
66
67
68
69

Id.
Id.
Jaffer & Rosenthal, supra note 63, at 293.
See RICK BRAZIEL, ET. AL., A CRITICAL INCIDENT REVIEW OF THE SAN BERNARDINO
PUBLIC SAFETY RESPONSE TO DECEMBER 2, 2016, TERRORIST SHOOTING INCIDENT AT THE
INLAND REGIONAL CENTER, 25 (2016). (“The IRC is a frequent training location for county
departments because of the conference room’s large size and its close proximity to the
county office building”).
70 Id.
71 Id. at 26.
72 Id.
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together they fired over 100 rounds.73 The attackers then fled in a
black SUV, leaving behind death and destruction.74
A short time later, officers spotted the same SUV miles away in
a neighboring town. A sergeant, as well as undercover police
officers that also happened to be in the area, attempted to execute
a traffic stop on the SUV.75 The SUV refused to pull over. After
making a turn, the back window of the SUV shattered from within,
as gunfire erupted from the vehicle. The gunfire was aimed at the
officers trailing close behind.76 An intense firefight ensued, with
the shooters firing 81 rounds at police, and at least 440 shots being
returned by police.77 Both shooters were killed.
Afterwards, police proceeded to process the crime scene and
discovered an encrypted iPhone in the shooter’s car. Because both
perpetrators were killed in the shootout, there was no way to
access its contents.78 The FBI, worried about more attacks,
“…promised to explore every investigative avenue in order to learn
whether the San Bernardino suspects were working with others,
were targeting others, or whether or not they were supported by
others.”79 Officials applied for numerous search warrants 80 to
search the digital devices and online accounts of Syed Rizwan

73
74
75
76
77
78

Id.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 38.
Id.
Id. at 40.
Joel Rubin, et al., FBI unlocks San Bernardino shooter’s iPhone and ends legal battle
with
Apple,
for
now,
L.A.
TIMES
(Mar.
28,
2016,
10:39
PM),
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-fbi-drops-fight-to-force-apple-to-unlock-sanbernardino-terrorist-iphone-20160328-story.html.
79 Id.
80 Richard Winton, A year after the San Bernardino terror attack, the FBI is still
struggling to answer key questions, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2016, 2:25 PM),
https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-san-bernardino-terror-probe-20161130story.html. Although Farook’s phone was owned by his employer, the San Bernardino
County Department of Public Health, and despite the employer’s consent to execute a
search of the phone, officials were unable to bypass the phone’s encryption software. The
FBI has been unable to make attempts to determine the passcode because Apple has
written, or “coded,” its operating systems with a user-enabled “auto-erase function” that
would, if enabled, result in the permanent destruction of the required encryption key
material after 10 erroneous attempts at the passcode (meaning that after 10 failed attempts
at inputting the passcode, the information on the device becomes permanently
inaccessible). When an Apple iPhone is locked, it is not apparent from the outside whether
or not that auto-erase function is enabled; therefore, trying repeated passcodes risks
permanently denying all access to the contents. See Rubin et al., supra note 78.
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Farook (“Farook”), and his wife, Tashfeen Malik (“Malik”).81 Thus,
the FBI turned to the All Writs Act, and the precedents of New
York Telephone Co., and its progeny. These efforts to access the
iPhone only bolstered Apple’s privacy and business concerns —
“th[at] [Apple] must contend with constant attempts by outside
parties to worm past [their] security measures.”82
B. The Order to Compel Apple’s Assistance in Accessing the
Encrypted iPhone
In order to Compel Apple’s assistance, the government relied on
the All Writs Act. To understand the framework in which the
Government and Apple were arguing, a brief overview and history
of the All Writs Act, are necessary at this point.
American courts have long had broad statutory authority to
“carry out their duties of an independent judiciary by issuing the
orders necessary to do so—even if Congress did not have the
foresight to” explicitly proscribe the necessary procedural
mechanisms that would effectuate those orders. 83 The All Writs
Act was initially enacted by the First Congress in 1789, and
provided:
That all the before-mentioned courts of the United States, shall
have power to issue writs of scire facias, habeus corpus, and all
other writs not specifically provided for by statute, which may be
necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and
agreeable to the principles and usages of law. 84
The Act has only been amended twice in the succeeding
centuries, but only in form, never in substance. 85 When the Act
has been amended, the statute’s text was simply modernized.
Today, the Act provides “[t]he Supreme Court and all courts
established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or
appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable
81 See Rubin et al., supra note 78.
82 Id.
83 In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d 341, 350 (E.D.N.Y. 2016); Adams v. United States

ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 273 (1942) (stating “Unless appropriately confined by
Congress, a federal court may avail itself of all auxiliary writs as aids in the performance
of its duties, when the use of such historic aids is calculated in its sound judgment to achieve
the ends of justice entrusted to it.”).
84 Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, § 14 (1789).
85 See id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2018).
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to the usages and principles of law. 86 The statute confers on all
federal courts the authority to issue orders where three
requirements are satisfied:
(1) The issuance of the write must be “in aid of” the issuing
court’s jurisdiction;
(2) The type of writ requested must be “necessary or
appropriate” to provide such aid to the issuing jurisdiction; and
(3) The issuance of the write must be “agreeable to the usages
and principles of law.87
It is important to note that some courts have not reached the
New York Telephone Co. factors because they conclude that the
Government’s request to compel assistance does not fall within the
reach of the All Writs Act itself.88 However, in the San Bernardino
action, the Government relied heavily on earlier applications of
The All Writs Act and analogized facts in those cases, particularly
New York Telephone Co., to the facts of their investigation and
insisted that their request fell within the statute’s authority. 89
Apple disagreed, and in motion practice both sides focused on the
three New York Telephone Co. factors necessary to allow lawful
use of the All Writs Act.90
1. Analysis of the Remoteness Factor of New York Telephone
Co.
The first factor asks whether Apple was “so far removed from
the underlying controversy that its assistance could not be
permissibly compelled.” 91 The core of this issue rests on whether
the mere fact that Apple designed, manufactured, and sold the
86 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).
87 Id.
88 See In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d at 353-54 (holding that an order to compel

assistance of the development of software to bypass iPhone encryption fell outside the
power of the All Writs Act because “Congress has considered but declined to adopt [such
broad power]—albeit without explicitly or implicitly prohibiting it—[and therefore] is not
agreeable to the usages and principles of law”).
89 Gov’t Ex Parte Application for Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in
Search at 6-8, In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d 341, 353-54 (2016) (No. 15-0451M), 2016
WL 680288, at *1.
90 Id.; Apple Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in
Search, and Opposition to Gov’t’s Motion to Compel Assistance, supra note 58, at 15, 20-21,
27, 29.
91 U.S. v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 174 (1977).
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device in question is enough on its own to establish that its
connection to the investigation is not too attenuated.92
The Government asserted that Apple’s development of the
device and subsequent placement of it into the stream of commerce
was sufficient to establish the first factor of New York Telephone
Co.93 The Government reasoned that since Apple wrote and
manufactured the software that runs the phone—the same
software preventing execution of the warrant—Apple has become
uniquely able to modify and control restrictions on the iPhone that
were hindering law enforcement’s ability to obtain critical
information.94 Accordingly, the Government concluded that since
Apple owns the very software that now must be used to enable the
search ordered by the warrant, Apple is not too “far removed” from
the situation and should be compelled to assist the government.95
Conversely, Apple argued that its relationship to the San
Bernardino attack is far too attenuated to satisfy the first prong of
New York Telephone Co.96 Essential to its argument is the premise
that “[t]he All Writs Act does not allow the government to compel
a manufacturer’s assistance merely because it has placed a good
into the stream of commerce.”97 Apple asserted that the All Writs
Act, if used in such a way, would “eviscerate the ‘remoteness’ factor
entirely” by allowing any company, no matter how attenuated its
connection to criminal activity, to be held accountable and subject
to compulsion to assist law enforcement.98 Accordingly, Apple
found that it is too “far removed” and attenuated to compel its
assistance.99
The first issue to be considered is whether Apple’s relationship
was sufficiently close to the attack that spurred the conflict
between Government and Apple. In New York Telephone Co., the
Supreme Court found the remoteness factor to be satisfied where
the telephone company’s property was “being used to facilitate a
92 See Gov’t Ex Parte Application for Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in
Search, supra note 89, at 6.
93 See id.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 7.
96 Apple Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in
Search, and Opposition to Gov’t’s Motion to Compel Assistance, supra note 12, at 20-21.
97 Id. at 16.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 15.
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criminal enterprise on a continuing basis.”100 Ownership of the
device used to commit a crime is direct involvement. Unlike New
York Telephone Co. where the intermediary owned the facility that
was being utilized for criminal communications, here, Apple has
no ownership interest whatsoever in the phone that was used in
the San Bernardino attack.101
Even if one was to assume that Apple’s financial benefit from
the product as a result of the sale of the phone to the consumer
establishes some type of involvement, the sale profits alone should
not be sufficient to satisfy the first prong of analysis. The fact of
the matter is, by the time the consumers were planning and
executing the attack, Apple had no direct involvement. Moreover,
Apple did not do anything to directly oppose the Government’s
investigation of the matter; instead it simply decided to take no
action.102 As a result, New York Telephone Co.,. would not find that
Apple would be so closely related to the underlying crime to make
compelling assistance under the All Writs Act appropriate.
2. Analysis of Whether Compelling Assistance would be
Unreasonably Burdensome
The parties then turned to the second issue, namely, whether
compelling assistance is unreasonably burdensome on Apple. The
Government argued that compelling Apple to assist in this
situation would not require “inordinate effort, and [the
Government would even offer] reasonable reimbursement” for its
efforts.103 The Government further emphasized that Apple, in its
ordinary course of business, would sometimes be required to write
such code in response to subpoenas or other processes. 104 Given
100 U.S. v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 174 (1977).
101 See id.; Apple Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents

in Search, and Opposition to Gov’t’s Motion to Compel Assistance, supra note 12, at 15.
102 See N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 174; In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d 341, 366
(E.D.N.Y. 2016).
(“Apple has not conspired with Feng to make the data on his device inaccessible. More
importantly, perhaps, it has not even done what the telephone company did in N.Y. Tel.
Co.—namely, it has not barred the door to its property to prevent law enforcement agents
from entering and performing actions they were otherwise competent to undertake in
executing the warrant for themselves.”).
103 Gov’ts Ex Parte Application for Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in
Search, supra note 89, at 7.
104 See id.
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this fact, the Government argued that Apple could not possibly
assert that the order could be overly burdensome.105 Additionally,
Apple’s unique ability to develop such a software code would allow
it to constrain any software developed for this instance to be
“tailored for this particular phone,” thus presenting no danger of
system malfunctions or disrupting business operations stemming
from privacy concerns.106
Apple asserted that the FBI’s order to compel assistance in this
situation would be repugnant to Apple’s strong interest in
maintaining the level of security that is associated with the brandvalue of its product.107 Essentially, this would impose a crippling
burden on the business by destroying the data technology that
Apple has spent years developing.108 As a practical matter,
compliance with such an order would require Apple to write a new,
previously non-existent code, which would demand engineers to
design, create, test, and validate the compromised operating
system.109 After that software was developed, Apple would then
have to supervise the operation by the FBI to brute force crack the
phone’s security.110 Such processes would also need to be logged
and recorded in case Apple’s methodology is ever scrutinized.111
Apple explained how this process of bypassing the passcode
security of just one iPhone “diverts man hours and hardware and
software from Apple’s normal business operations.” 112 Apple also
expressed its fear that if it was to comply with an order requiring
Apple to develop previously non-existent software, it would set
dangerous precedent that would require similarly situated
technology companies to “do the government’s bidding in untold
future criminal investigations” that would require the
development of new “hacking” departments devoted solely for
government purposes. 113
105 See id.
106 Id.
107 Apple Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in

Search, and Opposition to Gov’ts Motion to Compel Assistance, supra note 12, at 16-17.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 1, 2.
110 See id.
111 Id.
112 In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d 341, 370 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).
113 Apple Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in
Search, and Opposition to Gov’t’s Motion to Compel Assistance, supra note 12, at 18.
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In considering whether compelling Apple’s assistance would be
unreasonably burdensome, the crucial consideration is whether
the nature of the assistance required is within the day to day
operations of Apple’s business. Whereas the Court in New York
Telephone Co., had found that the utilization of a pen register was
not offensive to the business operations of the company because it
regularly employed pen registers for the use of billing operations,
detecting fraud, and preventing violations of law, the measures to
break through its encryption technology is not part of the day-today business operations of Apple. 114 Moreover, implementation of
such measures can substantially threaten Apple’s brand which is
built on its highly effective security capabilities.
Additionally, meeting the Government’s demands would burden
Apple, not just with the responsibility of development of
completely new software, but also, there would also be a
displacement of labor hours that would be required to carry out
the necessary development.115 As such, the Government’s
contentions that Apple regularly develops software code is not
comparable to the type of extensive decryption software that the
Government is seeking here. Accordingly, compelling Apple’s
assistance is also unreasonably burdensome.
3. Is Compelling Assistance Necessary to Effectuate the
Warrant?
Lastly, the Government asserted that Apple’s assistance is
necessary to effectuate the search warrant on the subject device.
In this case, the iPhone was suspected to have records of who was
communicating with Farook up to and during the attacks in San
Bernardino. These communications were determined to be critical
to law enforcement’s investigations, and inaccessible by any other
means known to the government or Apple.116 Consequently, the
Government asserted that Apple was the only entity that had the
ability to assist the government in unlocking the iPhone, and
ensuring the safety of the information contained therein. 117
114 U.S. v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 174-75 (1977).
115 In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d at 370.
116 Gov’ts Ex Parte Application for Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in

Search, supra note 58, at 8.
117 See id. at 4.
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On the other hand, Apple focused on distinguishing the
circumstances at issue with those of New York Telephone Co. In
New York Telephone Co., Apple argued that “there [was] no other
conceivable way to effectuate the government’s objective.” 118
However, in the case at hand, Apple asserted that the Government
failed to show that it even sought out or received any technical
assistance from alternate avenues with expertise in digital
forensics. Consequently, Apple argued failure to obviate the need
to compel Apple’s assistance should foreclose the endeavor it
pursues now.119 In so concluding, Apple demanded the District
Court to view this issue as one in which required the Court to “to
preserve certain rights at the expense of burdening law
enforcement’s interest in investigating crimes and bringing
criminals to justice.”120
Moreover, Apple was opposed to idly accepting any argument
that would have far-reaching policy consequences by stretching
the All Writs Act for purposes more extensive than it was intended
to address.121 While Apple recognized that the All Writs Act
confers the courts the power to “issue all writs necessary or
appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable
to the usages and principles of law,” here, Apple concluded that
the Act simply became the “‘issu[uance] [of] ad hoc writs whenever
compliance with statutory procedures appears inconvenient or less
appropriate’”—which is expressly forbidden by the Act itself. 122 If
the courts were allowed to do so, Apple argued, the Government
would essentially “short-circuit[] public debate on this
controversy, [which is] seem[ingly] fundamentally inconsistent
with the proposition that such important policy issues should be
determined in the first instance by the legislative branch after
public debate—as opposed to having them decided by the judiciary
in sealed, ex parte proceedings.”123

118 Apple Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in
Search, and Opposition to Gov’ts Motion to Compel Assistance, supra note 12, at 15.
119 See id. at 19-20.
120 Id. at 22.
121 See id. at 3.
122 Apple Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in
Search, and Opposition to Gov’ts Motion to Compel Assistance, supra note 12, at 15.
123 Id. at 19.
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Consequently, while it is clear that Apple likely has significant
ability to develop the necessary software to decrypt smartphones,
there is nothing in the record that suggested the Government has
sought alternative avenues of relief aside from the All Writs Act.
Without such options having been explored, the Government could
hardly argue that Apple’s assistance is necessary.
III.

DEVISING LEGISLATION TO ENSURE THE EXECUTION OF
LAWFUL WARRANTS ON SMARTPHONES

Ultimately, Apple was right, and its assistance was not
necessary in the FBI investigation. Instead, the FBI’s motion to
compel Apple to lend its assistance in gaining access to the iPhone
belonging to Farook was vacated because law enforcement was
able to unlock the encryption software by utilizing third party
resources.124 However, the issue of using the All Writs Act to
compel companies to break their own encryption software is still
unresolved in the courts. Since October 8, 2015, the Government
has submitted requests in nine other matters in the federal
courts—in California alone—to compel Apple to bypass the
passcode security of numerous devices. 125 There is no easy legal
resolution, and the issue is unlikely to be resolved through the All
Writs Act. Instead, this Note proposes that the legislature would
be best suited to shoulder the load of these weighty issues that
have the potential of having widespread social repercussions by
approving new legal innovations.

124 Danny Yadron, FBI confirms it won’t tell Apple how it hacked San Bernardino
shooter’s iPhone, GUARDIAN, (Apr. 28, 2016, 7:32 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2016/apr/27/fbi-apple-iphone-secret-hack-san-bernardino. FBI director James
Comey had stated the cost of unlocking the encryption software cost more than what he
would be paid during the rest of his tenure—upwards of a million dollars. Id.
125 In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d 341, 349 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).
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A. Existing Laws Are Ill-Equipped To Balance The
Security Interests of Law Enforcement and Privacy
Interests Of Citizens
Never before has the Court encountered a device with such
capacity for “storing and accessing a quantity of information, some
highly personal, that no person would ever had on his person in
hard-copy form.”126 Even if the judiciary attempted to answer this
complex legal issue, the resolution would not achieve a satisfying
outcome because a judicial resolution is limited to existing laws.
A court can only “mechanically apply . . . rule[s] used in the predigital era to a search of a cell phone.” 127
Justice Alito, concurring with the majority’s opinion in Riley,
voiced his opinion on the issue of whether the judiciary was
attempting to stretch its powers too far when he asserted that “it
would be very unfortunate if privacy protection in the 21st century
were left primarily to the federal courts using the blunt
instrument of the Fourth Amendment.”128 Similarly, a judge
presiding over a substantially similar issue regarding the United
States’ government’s motion to compel assistance in the Eastern
District of New York, ended his opinion by urging Congress and
others in the legislative branch of government to take action in
order to force this debate out of the courts, and force the “debate
. . . [to] happen today . . . among legislators who are equipped to
consider the technological and cultural realities of a world their
predecessors could not begin to conceive.”129 Thus, a “new
balancing of law enforcement and privacy interest” is called for in
order to address this issue. 130 The weight of this issue should fall
squarely on the shoulders of the”[l]egislatures, elected by the
people, [who] are in a better position than [the judiciary is] to
assess and respond to the changes that have already occurred and
those that almost certainly will take place in the future.” 131 Even
Apple recognized the amicability of such a solution and advocated
for a legislative solution in its own brief opposing a motion to
126
127
128
129
130
131

Riley v. Cal., 573 U.S. 373, 406-07 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 408 (Alito, J. concurring).
In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d at 376.
Riley v. Cal., 573 U.S. at 407 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 408.
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compel assistance that was submitted to the Court by the FBI. 132
There, Apple asserted that instead of the government seeking to
compel the creation of a compromised operating system, the FBI
would be better served by the “pursu[it] [of] new legislation,”
which it had not even attempted, 133 rather than “back[ing] away
from Congress and turning to the courts.”134 Courts and prominent
law enforcement officials have suggested several approaches to
analyzing how law enforcement may execute a lawfully obtained
search warrant to obtain information thereon.135 The best course
of action would be a bipartisan and cooperatively adapted
legislation made by law enforcement and tech giants such as Apple
and Google. Such legislation must tend to the concerns of all
interested parties—including the consumer—and dispel fears that
it would undermine the privacy afforded by smartphone
technology.136 The components of this proposal move to simply
“restore the status quo before Apple’s IOS 8.” 137
A successful solution requires a combination of two key
components: (1) cryptographic envelope security and (2) high civil
132 Apple Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in
Search, and Opposition to Gov’t’s Motion to Compel Assistance, supra note 12, at 2.
133 James B. Comey, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION STATEMENT BEFORE THE
SENATE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS: Threats to the
Homeland, (Oct. 8, 2015), https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/threats-to-the-homeland
(explaining that “[t]he United States government is actively engaged with private
companies to ensure they understand the public safety and national security risks that
result from malicious actors’ use of their encrypted products and services. However, the
administration is not seeking legislation at this time.”); Apple Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order
Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in Search, and Opposition to Gov’t’s Motion to
Compel Assistance, supra note 12, at 2.
134 Apple Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in
Search, and Opposition to Gov’t’s Motion to Compel Assistance, supra note 12, at 2.
135 See Compliance with Court Orders Act, S._, 114th Cong., 2d Sess. (2016) (discussion
draft available at https://www.burr.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/BAG16460.pdf); Digital
Security Commission Act, H.R. 4615, 114th Cong., 2d Sess. (2016) (text available at
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr4651/text/ih). Two pieces of federal
legislation have been proposed, but they have not gained traction sufficient to be passed
and affect meaningful change. The first bill was made in direct response to the San
Bernardino terrorist attack and is named the “Compliance with Court Orders Act of 2016.”
See Compliance with Court Orders Act. The second piece of federal legislation, dubbed the
“Digital Security Commission Act,” was fashioned in such a way to establish a “National
Commission on Security and Technology” challenges in the legislative branch to examine
“the intersection of security and digital security and communication technology in a
systemic, holistic way.” See Digital Security Commission Act.
136 See Tim Cook, A Message to Our Customers, APPLE (Feb. 16, 2016),
http://www.apple.com/customer-letter/ (asserting that “[o]nce created, the . . . [equivalent
of a master key] could be used over and over again, on any number of devices”).
137 See VANCE, JR., supra note 4, at 15.
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penalties to be imposed on the consumers of encrypted smartphone
technology. Each of these components will be examined in turn in
a legislative solution below.
B. A Legislative Solution Would Strike The Balance Between
The Competing Interests of Security And Privacy
A legislative solution does not alter all the present Fourth
Amendment requirements for ascertaining a warrant—the most
important of which requires it to “particularly describe[e] the . . .
things to be seized.” 138 This particularity requirement creates a
safeguard that prevents law enforcement from mistakenly
searching a place other than what the magistrate authorized. It
minimizes the risk that officers executing search warrants will by
mistake search a place other than the place intended by the
magistrate.139 Implicit in these traditional requirements is the
answer to Apple’s core concern, the center of which suspects the
unbridled ability of law enforcement to gain access into iPhones
that would open the floodgates, and compromise the privacy of
millions. These same rules lend their unwavering stability to the
present-day searches justified by a valid search warrant on cell
phones or other smart devices and does not change after the
implementation of this legislation.
Although Apple has voiced concern about overbroad authority of
law enforcement, there is no evidence that the ability of law
enforcement to execute lawful search warrants would be
detrimental in any way.
Numerous forensic experts and
technologists have concluded that the privacy concern voiced by
Apple is unfounded 140 because such software is useless without
physical possession of the device that an individual seeks to
decrypt.141 Therefore, naturally, such an option should be explored
if it would render answers to these complex legal issues that, so
far, have found no solution.

138
139
140
141

U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV.
2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 4.5, 5th ed. (2004).
See Cook, supra note 136.
See Vance, Jr., supra note 137, at 15.
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1. Cryptographic Envelope Security Would Sufficiently Guard
The Privacy Concerns That Encryption Was Meant To
Address
The most prominent concern for Tim Cook is the possibility that
Apple can be compelled to produce a master key that would fall
into the wrong hands, creating the ability for anyone to be able to
unlock any Apple device.142 This important concern can be met by
restrictive control of the process of access, even once the master
key is built through a multi-layered system for accessing
encrypted private information.
In addition to the Fourth Amendment, additional methods can
be used to balance the rights of a citizen with the necessity of law
enforcement to be able to access information with execution of a
valid warrant.143 The “cryptographic envelope” method is an
integral part of striking the appropriate balance that will address
this issue.144 This method creates “key[s]” that could decrypt data
in a series of “nested” envelopes, similar to the concept of “Russian
dolls,” with one envelope being outside of the next and only
accessible through the use of a specific “key” in the possession of
independent key-holders. Essentially, such a method would work
like this:
Suppose, for example, we put the filesystem key in an envelope
sealed with the FBI’s public key, and then put that sealed envelope
142 See Cook, supra note 136.
143 See Compliance with Court Orders Act, S._, 114th Cong., 2d Sess. (2016); Digital

Security Commission Act, H.R. 4615, 114th Cong., 2d Sess. (2016). See also Neema Singh
Guliani, 4 Problems with Creating a Commission on Encryption, ACLU. ORG (Mar. 9, 2016,
4:00
PM),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/internet-privacy/4-problemscreating-commission-encryption; Mark Jaycox, EFF Opposes McCaul-Warner Encryption
Comm’n, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Mar. 7, 2016), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/03/effopposes-mccaul-warner-encryption-commission. The second piece of federal legislation,
dubbed the “Digital Security Commission Act,” was fashioned in such a way to establish a
“National Commission on Security and Technology challenges in the legislative branch to
examine “the intersection of security and digital security and communication technology in
a systemic, holistic way.” See Digital Security Commission Act. Essentially, this legislation
was aimed only at examining the issues we already know to exist by appointing various
individuals to man each position of the board who were knowledgeable in various fields
relevant to the issue of search and seizure of data encryption. See id. After further
examination of the issue, the Commission would prepare several reports that would be used
for tackling the issue in the future. See id. While the Act garnered bipartisan support from
both the Senate and the House, there has been sharp criticism asserting that the
commission’s mission was “overly broad.” Id. Moreover, the Commission would simply
“prolong the encryption conversation,” in a time where the American people need answers.
144 See VANCE, JR., supra note 4, at 16.
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inside another envelope, this time sealed with the manufacturer’s
public key . . . To start with, the drive can no longer be decrypted
unilaterally by the FBI. The FBI doesn’t have the manufacturer’s
private key, it can’t open the outer envelope. The drive also can’t
be unilaterally decrypted by the manufacturer. Although the
manufacturer can open the outer envelope, only the FBI can open
the inner one to retrieve the filesystem key. Decryption of the drive
(at least, without knowledge of the user’s password) now
cryptographically requires both organizations to work with each
other—all but eliminating the possibility of criminal misuse by
insiders, or institutional misuse. 145
The “cryptographic envelope” method would ensure that
consumer’s privacy would be thoroughly protected.
Another simpler way of thinking about this cryptographic
envelope method is to analogize to a safety box at a bank. A safety
lock box requires two keys to be accessed: one belonging to the
owner of the contents of the box and the other belonging to the
bank where the box is stored and protected. The two key system
means that the owner of the box is required to go to the bank and
ask for access to their lock box. When the person’s credentials are
verified, the employee of the bank will bring them to their lock box
and insert their key. At that time, the owner of the contents of the
lock box will insert their own key, and with both keys in place, the
box is unlocked.
The safeguards afforded by the cryptographic method balance
the right of citizens to be secure in their private information stored
on cell phones and the need for law enforcement’s ability to
appropriately, and with only with the requisite authorization,
access information that is suspected to be used in furtherance of
criminal investigations.146

145 See Matt Tait, An Approach to Jim Comey’s Technical Challenge, LAWFARE INST.
(Apr. 27, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/approach-james-comeys-technicalchallenge.
146 See Nancy Gibbs & Lev Grossman, Here’s the Full Transcript of TIME’s Interview
with Apple CEO Tim Cook, TIME MAGAZINE (Mar. 17, 2016), http://time.com/4261796/timcook-transcript/ (“Let’s say they have a problem with you. They can come to you and say,
open your phone. And one way is for it to be between the government and you. Then you
can, I don’t know, they could pass a law that says you have to do it, or you have to do it or
there’s some penalty, or something. That’s for somebody else to decide. But it does seem
like it should be between you and them.”).
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2. Civil Sanctions Are Also Necessary To
Companies to Comply With Law Enforcement

[Vol. 32:4

Incentivize

Indeed, “privacy comes at a cost,” but the burden of such cost
should be borne by those best situated to carry the weight. 147 The
burden falls rightfully on the shoulders of those manufacturing the
products that dangerously hinder the ability of law enforcement to
investigate and prosecute criminal activities. Accordingly, an
obligation to build a bypass for encryption for all devices along
with civil sanctions for the failure to meet the obligation would be
another integral part of the proposed legislation. Essentially, this
“would be no different conceptually than legislation that requires
products to be safe, buildings to be constructed with exits and
egresses that satisfy specific requirements, and roads to have
maximum speed limits.” 148 In fact, various states and agencies
have proposed the use of civil sanctions in helping to find a
solution to the production of encrypted technology.149 New York
State, in particular, has seen some serious consideration.
All of the district attorneys in New York have proposed a specific
provision that would mandate that “[a]ny smartphone that is
manufactured on or after . . . [a certain date], and sold or leased in
New York, shall be capable of being decrypted and unlocked by its
manufacturer or its operating system provider.”150 New York
Assembly Bill A.8093A proposed an amendment to the New York
General Business Laws to require that any seller or lessor of a
“smartphone . . . that is not capable of being decrypted and
unlocked by its manufacturer or its operating system provider . . .
[be] subject . . . to a civil penalty of . . . [$2,500 per] smartphone . . .
if it . . . [can be] demonstrated that the seller or lessor . . . knew at
the time of the sale or lease that the smartphone was not capable
of being decrypted and unlocked . . . .”151 Violations of this law
would be enforced either by the district attorney of the county in
which the sale or lease occurred or by the state Attorney
147 Riley v. Cal., 573 U.S. 373, 401 (2014).
148 SMARTPHONE ENCRYPTION & PUBLIC SAFETY, supra note 4, at 15.
149 See id. at 24-26 (describing proposals from several states). See, e.g. Assemb.

A.8093A, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2015); Assemb. 1681, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016);
H.R. 1040, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2016).
150 VANCE, JR., supra note 4, at Appendix I.
151 N.Y. Assemb. A.8093A.
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General.152 Essentially, this would cause the profit from producing
and selling iPhones with default encryption to be dwarfed by the
penalty that would need to be paid for violation of the encryption
provisions.
California Assembly Bill 1681 is, for all intents and purposes,
the same as New York Assembly Bill A.8093A,153 but it was
amended to prohibit any manufacturer or operating system
provider who pays the civil penalty from passing on any portion of
it to smartphone purchasers, so that companies cannot shift the
financial burdens to the consumers. 154 Essentially, the California
bill would give law enforcement the authority to penalize the
manufacturers, like Apple and Google, who are directly
responsible for marketing a product with default-encryption.155
One important distinguishing feature of the California bill from
its New York counterpart is the fact that the California bill would
only impose a penalty for each instance in which a smartphone
could not be decrypted pursuant to a court order decreasing the
number of situations where the civil penalty would be imposed.156
As a result, the financial burden that would be borne by the
manufacturer would be as small or severe as the number of
instances where the government required assistance to enter into
the phone’s encryption.157
The imposition of civil sanctions would incentivize tech
companies to manufacture products that may be decrypted by
simply changing their cost-benefit analyses. Whereas it is still
profitable to manufacture and sell encrypted devices, by imposing
a civil sanction, the production of the same phone may result in a
loss of profit. The new proposal would lead to a situation where
the manufacturer would be incentivized to cooperate in the
balance between the interests of private citizens and law
enforcement.
The adoption of the aforementioned safeguards would restrict
the scope of law enforcement’s ability to access private information
and incentivize companies, like Apple and Google, to manufacture
152
153
154
155
156
157

Id.
See id.; Cal. Assemb. 1681.
Cal. Assemb. 1681.
See id.
See id.
See id.

DOCUMENT1 (DO NOT DELETE)

436

4/24/2019 3:43 PM

JRNL OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

[Vol. 32:4

products that would promise both the privacy and security of their
customers. The adoption of legislation with these components
serves the interests of all parties, which would enable companies,
like Apple and Google, to find solace in the fact that society has
asserted its will by a fair congressional vote.158
CONCLUSION
Law enforcement and companies, like Apple, must take the lead
on this issue that touches the lives of just about every single
American citizen. While there are competing interests on both
sides, those interests do not have to be dichotomous. While it is
clear that there is no way to find a solution where one side will not
have to compromise or to create a system without unintentional
vulnerabilities,159 in the end, the effort set forth will aid in
upholding the rights and freedoms that our government has
protected for centuries.
While criminal or even national security interests are not
enough, on their own, to justify the judicial orders originally
sought by law enforcement, the Framers of the Constitution
envisioned a legislative means of confronting this issue. These
highly divisive issues must be tried in the appropriate arena—
Congress—and not left to the judiciary to “fill in gaps in the law”
by forcing such political discussion to be decided by the Court.160
Legislation tapping into cryptographic envelope technology would
account for all of the aforementioned competing interests and
would strike the necessary balance between the citizen’s right to
158 See Apple Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in
Search, and Opposition to Gov’t’s Motion to Compel Assistance, supra note 58, at 3 (“If this
order is permitted to stand, it will only be a matter of days before some other prosecutor, in
some other important case, before some other judge, seeks a similar order using this case
as precedent. Once the floodgates open, they cannot be closed, and the device security that
Apple has worked so tirelessly to achieve will be unwound without so much as a
congressional vote.”).
159 Ellen Nakashima & Barton Gellman, As Encryption Spreads, U.S. Grapples with
Clash
Between
Privacy,
Security,
WASH.
POST
(Apr.
10,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/as-encryption-spreads-usworries-about-access-to-data-for-investigations/2015/04/10/7c1c7518-d401-11e4-a62fee745911a4ff_story.html?tid=a_inl.
160 Apple Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in
Search, and Opposition to Gov’t’s Motion to Compel Assistance, supra note 58, at 14.
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privacy and law enforcement’s duty to provide security to its
citizens.

